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Abstract 
 
This paper explains the conflictive and cooperative elements of energy diplomacy 
between the European Union (EU) and Russia. It argues that interdependence forms 
the underlying principle of this relationship and  creates both sensitivity and 
vulnerability for the interdependent parties, thus carrying the sperms of both conflict 
and cooperation. Both sides would be negatively affected by the other side’s non-
cooperation within the current policy framework  and  the  prevailing mistrust and 
recurring tensions can be explained by this sensitivity. However, even if both sides’ 
policies were adjusted, vulnerability interdependence would still prevent them from 
seriously reducing their energy cooperation. It is necessary then to see how EU and 
Russian energy diplomacy can converge and how their strategic energy partnership 
can be cemented. 
 Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou 
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1. Introduction: Setting the Framework for an Efficient Energy Partnership 
Since the mid-2000s  there has been renewed interest in the EU-Russia energy 
relationship,  following world price increases for  gas  and  petroleum,  the  struggle 
between Russia and Ukraine,  controversies regarding the regulation of (and  the 
access to) the European market and competing visions for energy security. EU-Russia 
energy trade is characterized by the creation of new infrastructure as well as the 
development of spot markets. In order to understand this relationship, the analysis 
must take into account that the economic interests of the two partners are not fixed 
and absolute but they flow from their perceptions of risks, opportunities and benefits.  
The paper focuses on both conflictive and cooperative elements of the EU-Russia 
relationship. It draws on two key terms of Keohane and Nye’s (2001) approach to 
complex interdependence:  sensitivity  and vulnerability. Sensitivity  refers to a 
country’s responsiveness within an existing policy framework and “means liability to 
costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the 
situation”, while vulnerability “can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs 
imposed by external events even after policies have been altered” (Keohane and 
Nye 2001: 11).  
As shown in Table 1 and building on Proedrou (2007), sensitivity refers to the losses 
each side may face in case the other does not live up to the obligations it has taken 
up. The uncertainty stemming from energy security dilemmas may well lead to the 
implementation of policies from both sides that aim to lessen dependence and thus 
diminish trade and cooperation. Vulnerability, on the other hand, is a driver for 
cooperation, in the sense that a significant decrease of cooperation in the energy 
sector  would be mutually detrimental.  The key difference between sensitivity and 
vulnerability interdependence hinges on the costs that countries would bear should 
relations between them be disrupted. 
The paper argues that the EU-Russia energy partnership is characterized by both 
conflictive and cooperative elements, sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence. 
In particular, while Gazprom’s dominant presence in the EU market propels 
diversification rhetoric and some diversification plans from the EU (explained by 
sensitivity interdependence), overall trade is far from being diminished due to the 
understanding that  a large-scale decrease of energy cooperation (diminished 
imports for the EU and exports for Russia) would entail dreadful consequences for 
both sides  stemming from their  vulnerability  interdependence.  The lack of real EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2012 
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alternatives makes it costly for both sides to rupture their relationship. In this light, the 
key to the maintenance of the  EU-Russia energy partnership is how to manage 
conflict as well as how to prevent disputes, mistrust and different perceptions (that 
flow from sensitivity) from jeopardizing EU-Russia energy trade.    
 
Table 1: Sensitivity and vulnerability in EU-Russia energy relations 
  ‘Complex interdependence’ 
(Keohane and Nye 2001) 
EU-Russia energy partnership 
Effects of 
sensitivity 
conflict, unilateral policies  lack of trust, hesitance, 
unilateral moves 
Effects of 
vulnerability 
cooperation, coordinated 
action 
maintenance and improve-
ment of cooperation  
Source: authors’ compilation. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 analyzes the EU’s unilateral policies that aim 
to ensure and improve its  state of energy security. Section 3 scrutinizes Russian 
energy strategy  and its tactics to maximize  energy leverage in Europe. Section 4 
examines the risks and uncertainties that characterize EU-Russia economic relations. 
Finally, Section 5 suggests ways for  compromising the stance of the two entities, 
solidifying their energy partnership and ensuring their energy security.        
 
2. EU Energy Diplomacy  
The actors under examination have distinctive institutional characteristics. The EU 
institutional architecture has little to do with the classical organization of the nation-
sate. Hence, member states’ energy policies often diverge due to different interests 
and  cognitive frameworks. Moreover, while European energy enterprises play  a 
significant role in the organization of the European energy sector, the Russian energy 
sector is largely ruled by the Kremlin; there are little margins left for Russian or foreign 
companies operating in Russia to manipulate the Kremlin’s energy policy, especially 
abroad (Pleines 2006; Sander 2007).   
 
2.1. Policy-making in the EU 
The EU is a  complex hybrid system of governance where both intergovernmental 
and supranational elements are present (Hix and Høyland 2011; Staab 2008). Energy 
policy features well this complex method of policy-making in the European arena. 
Members have yielded some of their former powers to supranational institutions, Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou 
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namely the European Commission and the Council of Ministers; however, they retain 
control of the procedure. Energy policy thus remains a national, not a supranational 
competence. In EU energy policy both  member  states and the supranational 
institutions have a crucial role to play, albeit in different areas, shaping a dynamic 
balance, often  in favor of the former (Buchan  2007a).  More specifically,  the 
European Commission has gained a number of competences in the energy field. Its 
pioneering role in promoting and ensuring the smooth functioning of the European 
internal market means that it is responsible for the deregulation of member states’ 
national energy markets and the growth of competition.  The Commission is also 
competent to mediate differences that may arise from its legislation. Recently, EU 
competencies have been further strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty and the new 
gas security regulation, which has granted  the Commission critical supervising 
authorities (Proedrou 2012;  Egenhofer and Behrens 2008:  3).  Evidently,  the 
Commission  should have a fundamental  role  in the energy policy of the Union. 
Contrary to the internal domain, however, where  its leverage is important, in the 
external domain its role is quite limited.  
Although the Commission participates in the energy dialogue with Russia and other 
significant suppliers, member states retain their sovereignty with regard to the most 
critical aspects of energy trade. More precisely, states determine their energy mix, 
choose  the suppliers and sign supply contracts. Despite all the fuss about 
‘Europeanizing’ the energy policy  and  taking decisions  in the  European Union, 
member states appear rather reluctant to cede such authority to the EU level. This 
attitude was clearly reflected in German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s comments on 
the Energy Policy for Europe (EPE) initiative (signed in March 2006) that “the source of 
energy mix is a national competence”  and that the EPE means  “coordination 
instead of centralisation” (Rettman 2006). 
 
2.2. Internal Controversies about EU Energy Diplomacy  
The European Commission is at pains to strengthen its role in EU energy policy, 
securing energy supplies. Its proposals, initiatives and legislative measures often clash 
with individual member-state energy policies and practices. The aim to reduce the 
EU’s sensitivity to any of its external suppliers led  the  Commission to set  the 
diversification of energy sources as a primary goal in the Green Papers of 2001 and 
2006. More specifically, it  defines energy security as ensuring that future essential 
energy needs are satisfied by means of sharing internal energy resources and EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2012 
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strategic reserves under acceptable economic conditions and by making use of 
diversified and stable, externally accessible sources  (European Commission 2006). 
This policy boils down to  exploiting reserves in North Africa and especially in the 
Caspian and Central Asia region in order to counter Russia’s increasing share in the 
European energy market. However, little has been done in this direction (Socor 2007). 
The Commission lacks the power to organize EU energy policy and to turn European 
investors and member states towards common European interests in these regions.1 
Its policy proposals contrast sharply with some member states’ practices that prefer 
dependence  on a single supplier  (Sander, 2007). Actually, while member  states 
should, according to the Commission’s proposals, attempt to reduce dependence 
on a single source, they follow a different rationale. Germany’s strategy of extending 
bilateral energy deals with Russia in order to strengthen the position of Germany as a 
major gas and power provider in the EU, and thus intensifying Central Europe’s 
dependence on Russian energy, is the most indicative example. No wonder, thus, 
that  the fragmented policy-making in European energy issues hinders the 
implementation of a coherent and effective line of action in the energy sector. In 
the words of de Jong (2001: 1),  
Particular provisions concerning external relations were and remain few and 
far between [… there is] vocal but inconsistent common security of supply 
policy. Bilateral energy deals with third countries prevail while undermining the 
ability of the EU to ‘speak with one voice’ […] The missing provision of detailed 
security of supply rules leads to the proliferation of national, uncoordinated 
and counterproductive approaches, as well as the perception of a lack of 
long‐term strategy in order to address vulnerabilities.  
 
This is also obvious when looking at the degree of liberalization that each state has 
forced on its internal energy market. The Commission perceives the establishment of 
a unified, liberalized EU energy  market as the cornerstone for European energy 
security, since “energy sector deregulation –  permitting utilities freedom in setting 
prices, in choice of technology, and in contracting with fuel suppliers – effectively 
increases the elasticity of utility gas demand and limits the market power of gas 
sellers”  (Jaffe and Soligo 2006: 462). Thus, a unified energy market  enhances 
competition, is conducive to lower prices for the European consumers and proves to 
be a valuable means for the EU to respond to energy crises (Finon and Locatelli 
2002). Accordingly, the Commission puts pressure for the progressive liberalization of 
                                                 
1 As Finon and Locatelli (2007: 7) note, its role is limited; the European Commission has “some 
power within the framework of the Trans European Networks policy to assist financially the 
setting up of major transit and import facilities that contribute to greater diversification”. Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou 
8 
the European energy market as the best vehicle to facilitate intra-EU energy trade 
and in order to reduce Europe’s sensitivity vis-à-vis external suppliers. Its ambitious 
plans were, nonetheless, moderated by member states’ reactions and inputs to the 
initial proposals. The aforementioned plan is not realised due to significant resistance 
of some member states that  are sceptical about the effects of full liberalization, 
resulting in a partial liberalisation of the EU energy market  (European Commission 
2009).  
However, the Commission insisted  in the 1990s that state monopolies should break 
up and new, private supply corporations should gain at least a one third share of the 
members’ national energy markets  (European Commission, 2007).  With the 
exception of Britain and the Scandinavian states that liberalized their energy markets 
before 1990’s, most EU member states fall well behind the expectations. Evidently, 
the goal of energy liberalisation is not yet fulfilled. The states that entered the EU in 
2004 lag even further behind; the  Baltic  states  have  retained  their gas supply 
monopolies for fear of seeing Russian companies enter their market and in Poland 
the first private gas supplier entered the market only in 2006 (Checchi, Behrens and 
Egenhofer 2009: 22-24; CIEP 2010; European Commission 2009).  
The Commission’s initiative to break up monopoly companies and allow other 
players’ entrance into the market was intended to increase competition and spur 
economic growth. However, it proved counter-productive.  The largest energy 
companies rushed to consolidate their market power through mergers and 
acquisition  of smaller companies with the tacit support of their governments. For 
example, the German companies RWE and E.ON Ruhrgas have captured significant 
shares in the Balkan and Central European markets through the acquisition of supply 
networks and distribution companies (Auer 2007).  At the same time,  European 
governments moved to prevent domestic energy assets from passing in foreign 
hands. The Gaz de France-Suez merger and the French state’s role in the deal is the 
most indicative example. The Italian utility Enel had made a bid to buy the French 
utility Suez. However, France’s reluctance to let Suez pass into foreign hands led it to 
block the proposed merger; subsequently, state company Gaz de France stepped in 
and merged with Suez. The new company, in which the French state retains a 
blocking minority, came into being in September 2007 with the then French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s support and blessing.  This agreement created Europe's largest 
buyer and seller of natural gas, Europe’s biggest natural gas distributor, as well as 
Europe’s biggest Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) importer. Gaz de France-Suez is also the EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2012 
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company with the largest storing capacity of gas in the continent and the fifth 
biggest supplier of electric energy in the whole of the EU (Dempsey and Bennhold 
2007). Electric companies in Spain and Germany have also followed the same path 
of  strengthening their grip on their national markets with their governments’ tacit 
support (Kanter 2006). At a time when the EU calls for the Europeanization and 
internationalization of energy companies in  order to steer up competition and 
enhance the function of the internal energy market, national governments are keen 
to  prevent  foreign companies from gaining access to their  national  markets 
(European Commission 2007). 
The result is that the European market is currently dominated by a handful of energy 
companies, namely Russia’s Gazprom, Germany’s E.ON Ruhrgas, Italy’s Eni, the 
Netherlands’ Gasunie and Norway’s Norsk-Hydro. Such concentration of power is 
followed by allegations about secret agreements between them not to enter each 
other's markets. This not only leaves their economic activities and profits untouched, 
but also diminishes competition. At the same time, such concentration of power 
serves as hindrance to new entrants in the European energy market.  
Taking into account all these facts,  the European Commission proposed  the 
separation of supply and network ownership as a necessary prerequisite for the 
growth of competition and the establishment of a well-functioning open market 
(Auer 2007). The Commission has made two alternative suggestions, favouring the 
former: the first provides for the unbundling of the companies that own the networks 
in two independent economic entities,  one operating  the system and the other 
producing and trading energy. The second suggestion concerns the establishment 
of an  independent network operator (European Commission 2007).  The most 
powerful EU members, most prominently France and Germany, have opposed these 
proposals fearing a significant loss of income for their companies and a dysfunctional 
energy market. They have instead suggested a third way, which was finally 
approved by the European Commission in 2009. Accordingly, companies would 
retain full ownership of their networks. A transmission system operator (TSO) would be 
founded to monitor fair access to the pipelines and to realize network modernization 
investments when necessary. This operator, contrary to the second option, would 
remain under the same ownership structures, but would be bound to meet the EU-
wide terms pertaining to third party access (Pollit 2008). These developments have 
led to a  “softer version of unbundling that retains a significant place in the gas 
market for national champions” and pay lip service to the complex ways of policy-Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou 
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making within the EU in the energy sector (Proedrou 2012: 63). According to de Jong 
(2011: 1),  
key institutional problems of EU policy addressing gas security of supply result 
from the pervasive effects of 27 diverging predilections for market‐based 
energy procurement, natural resource endowments, national champions 
interests, foreign policies and geographic neighbourhood specificities, as well 
as the unwillingness of the Member States to give the rudder to a 
supranational body”.  
 
The result is that  liberalization is not fully utilized as a shield of protection against 
monopolistic practices and structures, and the EU’s sensitivity to the energy leverage 
of external players (especially Russia) is perpetuated. The following section examines, 
in turn, Russia’s policy-making and energy diplomacy vis-à-vis Europe. 
 
3. Tracing the Content of Russian External Energy Policy 
Contrary to the case of the European  Union, the Russian energy sector is heavily 
regulated and centralized. The state retains a preponderant role through Gazprom 
(51% share), through  state-owned oil company Rosneft and  through state-owned 
Transneft  (Pleines 2006). Since the state is enmeshed in the main Russian energy 
enterprises, economic decision-making and the management of energy resources 
lacks transparency and often takes place on political, not economic grounds and 
calculations. This renders Russia a more difficult and less consistent partner. 
 
3.1. Aggressive Russian Energy Diplomacy in the ’New’ Europe  
Throughout the Cold War the Soviet Union proved itself a steady trade partner. After 
the fall of the Berlin Wall Russia as the successor state maintained and increased 
energy exports to the west European market (Stern 2005). At the same time, 
however, it started using energy as a weapon to exploit ‘new’ Europe’s energy 
vulnerability and elicit geopolitical advantages in the region. In 1992 Russia cut 
energy supplies to the Baltic countries with the aim to put pressure on them to drop 
their demands for the withdrawal of Russian troops stationed there. In  1998-2000 
Transneft ceased manifold oil supplies to Lithuania in order to force it to hand over 
the Lithuanian port and refinery of Mazeikiu Nafta. In 2004 Gazprom cut gas supplies 
to Belarus in order to put pressure on Belarus to sell its assets in the Belarusian gas 
network. As a result also Lithuania and Poland received reduced gas quantities for a 
while (Smith 2006). In 2006 and 2009 Gazprom withheld gas supplies from Ukraine for EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2012 
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a number of reasons: demand for higher gas prices, purchase  of shares in the 
Ukrainian gas network  and retaliation for Ukraine’s pro-western stance. In 2007 
Transneft cut oil supplies to Belarus to demand higher gas prices and shares in the 
Belarusian gas network and to show Russia’s reluctance to keep subsidizing President 
Lukashenka’s regime. These crises also resulted in the interruption of energy supplies 
to EU countries (Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria etc.) for a few days, revealing Europe’s 
sensitivity to Russian energy exports (Larsson 2006b; McFaul 2006; Pirani, Stern and 
Yafimava 2010; van der Linde and de Jong 2009; Yafimava 2010).  
Additionally, Russia’s pipeline diplomacy is set to further expose ‘new’ Europe’s 
vulnerability to Russian energy leverage. The recently inaugurated Nord Stream runs 
under the Baltic Sea and carries  natural gas directly to Germany. Traditionally, 
Russian gas has been imported by Germany via Belarus, Poland and Ukraine, which 
has made Germany vulnerable to Russian supply interruptions aimed at Ukraine or 
Belarus. Nord Stream is therefore “an excellent  project for securing Germany’s 
energy imports and mounting gas needs without facing the risks mentioned above” 
(Larsson 2007: 54). From the Russian perspective, it will enable Gazprom to supply gas 
to the most lucrative markets of north-western Europe directly,  bypassing  Ukraine, 
Belarus, Poland, Slovakia and the Baltics. Poland and the Baltic  states  reacted 
ferociously to this plan comparing the Russo-German deal with the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact of 1939 and accusing Germany for advancing its own interests at 
the cost of those of its European partners. The significance of the new project lies in 
the weakening of East and Central European states vis-à-vis Moscow. Their role as 
transit countries integrates them in the Russia-Europe energy chain and thus ensures 
their energy security. Through the new pipeline Gazprom will be able to supply its 
north-western European partners, while playing its energy card with the ex-Soviet 
allies (Baran 2008: 158). It leaves the latter exposed to Russia’s unilateral manipulation 
of gas offer and prices and use of energy for political and geostrategic purposes.  
Nord Stream is much more expensive  than investments on the doubling of the 
existing Yamal  pipeline through Belarus and Poland would be  (Dempsey 2005). 
Upgrading the capacity of the main gas pipeline through Ukraine would also be a 
much cheaper option. Nevertheless, this new pipeline lessens Russia’s dependence 
on ambivalent transit states such as Ukraine and Belarus, serving as a diversification 
of export routes. Despite, and in parallel with, this economic logic, one cannot fail to 
see the obvious political implications of such a move. Nord Stream allows Russia to 
maintain different policies towards ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe: expanding energy ties Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou 
12 
with the first and utilizing  energy as a political lever against the second (Larsson 
2007).2 As Robert Larsson (2007: 44-46) comments,  
the pipeline cannot be seen as a common European project, as it divides the 
EU into two halves, those that are for it and those that are against it […] A key 
problem for the Baltic states and Poland is that they have few supporters in 
this matter. Some of the larger nations have interests in the project and those 
that are not affected are not necessarily willing to support the new members if 
it also risks affecting relations to the larger nations and to Russia. As Brussels has 
been rather positive, it is neither a natural ally against Russia, if anything were 
to happen. 
 
In addition to bypassing transit countries, Russia has secured for itself the bulk of the 
gas Central Asian states are going to produce for the coming years, thus leaving the 
‘new’  European members with hardly any viable alternatives,  increasing their 
vulnerability to steady energy flow from Russia even further. The same holds true with 
regard to Russia’s assertive commercial policy in ‘new’ Europe  that  aims  at the 
acquisition of critical infrastructure in order to fortify its role in the EU market as well as 
to control the energy chain. The most indicative example is the embargo imposed 
on the Latvian port of Ventspils that used to be a main export outlet during Soviet 
and early Russian times. Latvia’s rejection of Russian offers to buy the port led the 
Kremlin to forbid Russian companies to use it, despite the latter’s issuance of formal 
complaints. As Transneft's Vice-President Sergei Grigorev puts it, “oil can flow only 
from Russia. You can of course sell [the port] to Westerners. But what are they going 
to do with it? Turn it into a beach?” (Lelyveld 2003). At the same time, Russia follows 
an expansive policy in the European downstream energy sector. This policy can be 
traced more in, but is not confined to, ‘new’ Europe. In addition to the preponderant 
role Gazprom enjoys in the EU’s eastern gas market, it has created joint ventures in 
Germany  thus entering the retail market  and  is fortifying its presence in the spot 
market that has emerged in Britain. The role of Russian oil companies is also important 
in a handful of EU members, such as Bulgaria, where they enjoy a dominant share of 
the market. All these add to European sensitivity and vulnerability (Proedrou 2007). 
 
                                                 
2 The ‘new’ European states proposed the construction of an alternative route that would 
carry Russian gas through the Baltics to Central and Western Europe, the ‘Amber’ route. As it 
would bypass Ukraine and Belarus, pass only through EU territory and involve a number of EU 
countries, it would be a project with a pan-European character. This proposal was, however, 
not seriously examined by the EU (Larsson 2007). EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2012 
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4. Uncertainties and Dilemmas of EU-Russia Energy Relations 
The European Commission’s approach towards achieving energy security can be 
summed up to the proper functioning  of the energy market. This entails not only 
efforts to liberalize the EU energy market but also the wider European energy market. 
The signing of the Energy Charter Treaty in 1994 aimed exactly at the establishment 
of a free-market energy sector spanning from the East to the West. Russia, however, 
although it has signed it, refuses to ratify the Charter, sticking to its preference for an 
energy sector tightly controlled by the Kremlin. In an era where nationalization of 
natural resources takes place, Brussels has been largely powerless  to impose the 
unbundling of the upstream and downstream energy sectors and ensure the EU’s 
security of supplies through a unified liberalized energy market (Larsson 2006a; de 
Jong 2008: 60–61; Haghighi 2007). As the EU’s main supplier, Russia aims at retaining a 
stronghold on its natural resources, and the goal of an open energy market risks to 
fall apart. Finon and Locatelli (2007: 7) eloquently comment that “the limits to the 
effectiveness of this [EU] international approach are all too apparent with a country 
such as Russia which is still a traditional power, deploys diplomacy backed by force 
to reassert its influence in its ‘near abroad’  and is determined to use its energy 
resources to exert geopolitical influence”.  
Gazprom’s penetration into the EU downstream sector raises serious reactions within 
the EU, since it gives  Gazprom, a company that refutes liberal policies, a quasi-
monopolistic position in the EU gas market. The excessive reliance on an external 
supplier that will enjoy a preponderant role in the EU market, and thus may be able 
to set prices, is not compatible with EU energy policy. Apparently, it is a high risk for 
the EU to take (Hartley and Medlock III 2006; Thumann 2006). At the same time, it can 
hamper the most important rationale for Russian energy imports into the EU: its 
reliability. Since liberalization takes place rather slowly and a single European energy 
market has yet to emerge, and in view of persistent controversies with Gazprom, the 
European Commission has contemplated to change the rules and the rationale of 
the energy game (Buchan 2007b). It would allow a special and more protectionist 
status for the energy sector in order to prevent the energy market from falling into 
the hands of Gazprom; Russian energy companies would not be allowed to buy into 
European ones, unless they open up their own assets to European firms;  and  the 
commercial activities of corporations that have a dual role in the EU market, both as 
energy producers and distributors, would have been forbidden (Goldirova 2007).  Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou 
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These plans aimed to put pressure on Russia to liberalize the Russian gas sector, to 
reduce the EU’s sensitivity to Russian supplies and to enhance EU energy security, 
especially in light of the concerns for Gazprom’s capacity to maintain and increase 
its output in the coming years. While most fields currently under exploration in Russia 
face decreasing productivity, the plans for sufficient production from new fields have 
yet to materialize. The projections show that Russia will have difficulties in sustaining 
energy production at the current level, at the same time that energy demand in the 
EU is seen to rise significantly in the coming years (Pirani 2009; Stern 2005).   
Furthermore, a number of new pipelines agreed upon (see below) will reduce, albeit 
not eliminate, the importance of non-EU transit states in the Russia-EU energy trade. 
Ukraine and Belarus are set to remain significant transit countries for Russian oil and 
gas. As the recent Russo-Ukrainian and Russo-Belarusian crises depicted, smooth 
relations with transit countries are a prerequisite for steady Russia-EU energy trade 
(Percival 2008). The EU and Russia thus share an interest in finding a working 
framework with these countries.     
Last but not least,  Russia’s utilization of energy as a political tool  towards its 
neighbours can upset regional stability. Russia’s ‘energy war’ with Georgia (cut of 
supplies, abrupt increase of gas prices) added to an atmosphere of hostility that 
paved the way for an actual war, albeit fought mainly on ethnic-nationalist terms, in 
August 2008 between Russia and Georgia. The war pitted EU members against each 
other with regard to the policy the EU should follow vis-à-vis Russia and its actions in 
Georgia. Such developments are contrary to one of the fundamental goals of the EU 
namely, the preservation of stability in Europe. Larsson (2007: 41-45) thus makes the 
point that “this ‘energy game’, where Russia aims to create and play by its own rules 
[…] brings about risks of increased internal competition in the EU” and warns that 
“without acknowledging the priorities of the new members, EU might lose legitimacy 
in its northern dimension and common EU-projects as well as integration in general 
might be more difficult to achieve”. 
 
5. The Merits of an Active EU-Russia Strategic Partnership 
Unless progress in all these aspects takes place, sensitivity of both sides may rise and 
direct them to conflictive  policies that can potentially  further deteriorate the 
conditions of their energy trade. The implementation of protectionist measures from 
the  EU  would increase the two sides’ sensitivity and vulnerability to imports and EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2012 
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exports, respectively,  and could thus have a severe impact on EU-Russia energy 
relations.  In case of implementation,  it is likely that the outcome would  be 
significantly less gas for the EU, as well as reduced energy revenues for Russia. 
Prudence talks against its realization, and both sides should take steps to come to 
terms with a shared regulatory framework.  
The EU  and Russia have throughout the 2000s settled  thorny issues with regard to 
long-term contracts, import limitations and destination clauses. These agreements 
can only be interpreted as results of their increased sensitivity and vulnerability, and 
their subsequent  will to keep reaping benefits from their partnership. In this 
understanding, it would be much more helpful if the EU, instead of trying to impose 
unbundling regulations to exporting companies such  as Gazprom, were  to find a 
mutually acceptable and beneficial compromise on energy issues. Despite ample 
rhetoric, the EU does not in its whole, as we saw above, endorses full liberalization but 
opts for a semi-liberalized market. Russia, on the other hand, although viewing the 
interference of politics and the state in the economy and trade  as essential, 
understands the benefits that market mechanisms can bring. It is in this context that 
a full-fledged debate on the issues surrounding the liberalization of the Eurasian gas 
market could provide the  foundations for the maintenance of amiable energy 
relations between the EU and Russia (Proedrou 2012: 128-129). As de Jong (2011: 12, 
22, 36) alleges,  
past and ongoing discussions on gas industry structures, such as the ownership 
unbundling of infrastructures, gas market designs, and the target model, are 
not always helpful in building and developing a secure gas supply system 
between the EU and Russia […]  Realizing that they need to invest large 
amounts of money to develop production and supply lines that EU consumers 
would like to be served with, suppliers such as Gazprom […] are complaining 
about understanding the EU market and its governance by a variety of 
countries and authorities that may even be working in different directions […] 
That would include the need to find a way in creating joint understandings 
between oligopolistic supply structures and non-oligopolistic demand 
structures in a context of semi-monopolistic vital infrastructures. 
 
Both Russia and the EU have to take measures to smooth the progress of  their 
partnership and hence facilitate  their energy security. From the European 
perspective, what is needed is a common European energy policy. The EU should 
forge a common stance vis-à-vis supplier countries in a way similar to the EU trade 
policy in order to exploit its potential as the biggest market in the world. At the same 
time, it should intensify its efforts for the creation of a competitive, interconnected Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou 
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and single Europe-wide internal energy market.  These  should, and can only,  be 
accomplished  through the establishment of a new framework for energy policy-
making, whereby the Commission would have a central role. Simply put, since the 
energy challenges act on an international, and not national level, energy problems 
should be dealt with at the supranational level. As a Deutsche Bank study concludes, 
“piecemeal efforts at the national level have proved inadequate. Only a concerted 
European energy policy can generate hope for a sustainable future” (Auer 2007: 1).  
On the other hand, Russia pursues an aggressive energy policy that aims to exploit 
‘new’ Europe’s vulnerability,  thus challenging EU solidarity. The Union’s response 
remains fragmented. This sends the wrong signal to the Kremlin that it can maintain 
its tactics of divide et impera in Europe. This patchy line of action preserves mishaps 
in EU-Russia energy relations and diverts the two parties’ dialogue from its focal 
issues, namely, investments in the upstream and downstream sector and 
liberalization of the energy market. From the Russian perspective, the pursuance of 
political gains utilizing the energy lever undermines Russia’s reliability as a supplier 
and EU-Russia trade. In the medium  term,  Russia stands to lose more from the 
maintenance of such policies in comparison to a less politicized attitude that would 
render it by far the most significant, reliable and powerful actor in the EU energy 
market.  In addition,  more transparency in its dealings with the EU is essential. 
Estimations about Russian productivity are hard to make since the Russian state 
refuses to publish  all data concerning its future productivity levels. Evidently, 
however, Russia puts  more emphasis on making inroads into the European 
downstream sector than on  investing  in exploration schemes  in order to sustain 
sufficient levels of productivity in the medium term. This adds to European anxiety 
and decreases trust in Russia as a reliable supplier (Pirani 2009).    
When it comes to pipeline diplomacy, the case of South Stream can serve as a 
blueprint for future Russia-EU energy infrastructure. Although virtually a deal made by 
Gazprom and the Italian energy company ENI, with no planning and contribution 
from the European Commission, the new pipeline is going to carry Russian gas to at 
least seven EU member states (Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria and 
Romania). Moreover, since Russian gas is going to pass under the Black Sea and 
reach directly Bulgaria, an EU member  state, there is no danger created by the 
transit of gas through non-EU territory. That means that South Stream is an exclusively 
EU-Russia project since it involves only these two parts. It also has a pan-European 
character since it will supply a handful of EU countries, leaving Russia with no room EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2012 
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for manoeuvre to supply selectively some members and play political games against 
others (Mityayev 2007).  
Although such projects will facilitate EU-Russia energy trade, the need to create a 
working framework with non-EU transit countries remains. The establishment of the 
Early Warning Mechanism by Moscow and Brussels in the autumn of 2007, whereby 
both sides agreed to inform each other in time of any export shortages or import 
problems, caused either by political or technical problems, is a good starting point 
(Cleutinx and Piper  2008).  Still, Ukraine and Belarus have to  accept embedding 
bilateral problems within a cooperative framework. Such a development would 
stabilize the Russia-Europe energy chain and  thus minimize  their sensitivity vis-à-vis 
each other.    
 
6. Conclusion: Considerations for a Fruitful Energy Partnership  
This paper examined the conflictive and cooperative elements of EU-Russia energy 
diplomacy. It argues in favour of an active strategic partnership in view of the 
relationship’s underlying sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence. A number of 
fundamental policy steps could cement the EU-Russia energy partnership. The first 
concerns the creation of a mutually agreed upon regulatory framework that 
accepts a semi-liberalized market rationale. This presupposes a gradual 
convergence on the rules of the game. The second step would be to strengthen the 
joint  preventive mechanisms, identifying possible shortfalls in energy supply at an 
early stage, and taking all necessary unilateral and bilateral actions to face them. 
This also creates the necessity for a common framework of EU energy policy-making, 
whereby the European Commission would have a central role.   
The ultimate long-term target of these steps is, evidently, the establishment of a new 
integrated strategic partnership in energy issues  with competitive  prices, secured 
supply and effective regulation. Such an understanding flows from a cooperative 
logic that is based upon the interdependence that binds the two sides. In particular, 
vulnerability makes exit from bilateral trade a rather imprudent and costly option. It 
thus fortifies bilateral EU-Russia ties and delimits the impact of unilateral policies that 
flow from sensitivity and create tensions, cultivate mistrust and imperil EU-Russia 
energy trade.  
 Konstantinos Hazakis & Filippos Proedrou 
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